Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
证明在同时升价拍卖中，即使买家效用函数存在强互补性，合谋均衡依然存在；竞拍者通过分割物品压低价格，但互补性在合谋均衡中从未实现，且合谋空间随竞拍者与物品数量比增大而缩小。
Collusive equilibria exist in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with multiple objects, even with large complementarities in the buyers' utility functions. The bidders collude by dividing the objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. In the most collusive equilibrium the complementarities are never realized. The scope for collusion however narrows as the ratio between the number of bidders and the number of objects increases. Copyright 2002, Wiley-Blackwell.