The Entry‐Inducing Effects of Horizontal Mergers: An Exploratory Analysis
探讨横向合并是否真的能诱导新企业进入市场，发现当进入的沉没成本较高时，合并创造的进入机会太小，不足以吸引进入，甚至可能使原本有利可图的合并变得无利可图。
Antitrust law presumes that entry normally prevents or reverses anticompetitive effects from horizontal mergers. But when sunk costs associated with entry are at levels suggested by prevailing market structure, the opportunity for entry created by an anticompetitive merger plausibly is too small to induce entry, even absent Stiglerian ‘barriers to entry.’ This is illustrated for Cournot and Bertrand models. Significant entry also makes otherwise profitable Bertrand mergers unprofitable, assuming no efficiency gains. Consequently, the entry issue can be collapsed into the efficiency issue: if a presumably profitable merger does not generate significant efficiencies, it cannot be expected to induce entry.