Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
提出一类策略，在私人不完全监测下，每个玩家的后续策略独立于其对对手私人历史的信念，并刻画了均衡收益，发现除囚徒困境外，即使噪声消失，此类策略也不足以产生民间定理。
We introduce a class of strategies that generalizes examples constructed in two-player games under imperfect private monitoring. A sequential equilibrium is belief-free if, after every private history, each player's continuation strategy is optimal independently of his belief about his opponents' private histories. We provide a simple and sharp characterization of equilibrium payoffs using those strategies. While such strategies support a large set of payoffs, they are not rich enough to generate a folk theorem in most games besides the prisoner's dilemma, even when noise vanishes. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.