Leader Punishment and Cooperation in Groups: Experimental Field Evidence from Commons Management in Ethiopia
通过实地实验，研究了现实中的领导者在公共资源管理中作为第三方惩罚群体成员的不同方式，发现强调平等和效率的领导者能带来更好的森林管理结果，而反社会型领导者则导致较差结果。
We conduct a social dilemma experiment in which real-world leaders can punish group members as a third party. Despite facing an identical environment, leaders are found to take remarkably different punishment approaches. The different leader types revealed experimentally explain the relative success of groups in managing their forest commons. Leaders who emphasize equality and efficiency see positive forest outcomes. Antisocial leaders, who punish indiscriminately, see relatively negative forest outcomes. Our results highlight the importance of leaders in collective action, and more generally the idiosyncratic but powerful roles that leaders may play, leading to substantial variation in group cooperation outcomes.