Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Private Information
研究不同竞争设定下均衡信贷合同与资源配置，解释抵押品的经济作用，发现高质量借款人即使有无限抵押品也可能被挤出市场，且可能提供更多抵押品。
ABSTRACT The authors examine equilibrium credit contracts and allocations under different competitivity specifications and explain the economic roles of collateral under these specifications. Both moral hazard and adverse selection are considered. The principal message is that how a competitive equilibrium is conceptualized significantly affects the characterization of equilibrium credit contracts. Specifically, some well‐known results in the rationing literature are shown to rest delicately on the adopted equilibrium concept. Two somewhat surprising results emerge. First, high‐quality borrowers with unlimited collateral may be priced out of the market despite the bank having idle deposits. Second, high‐quality borrowers may put up more collateral.