Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the Aftermath of Financial Crises
研究发现金融危机后国家政治更极化、执政联盟更弱，这降低了重大金融改革的可能性，尽管此时改革收益可能很大。
Countries become more politically polarized and fractionalized following financial crises, reducing the likelihood of major financial reforms precisely when they might have especially large benefits. The evidence from a large sample of countries provides strong support for the hypotheses that following a financial crisis, voters become more ideologically extreme and ruling coalitions become weaker, independently of whether they were initially in power. The evidence that increased polarization and weaker governments reduce the chances of financial reform and that financial crises lead to legislative gridlock and anemic reform is less clear-cut. The US debt overhang resolution is discussed as an illustration.