COSTLY BUYER SEARCH IN LABORATORY MARKETS WITH SELLER ADVERTISING*
通过实验室实验，研究卖方同时选择价格和广告策略时，买方搜索成本对市场均衡的影响，发现实际价格低于理论预测，广告更密集，市场更接近完全信息竞争均衡。
In this experiment, sellers simultaneously choose prices and advertising strategies. Buyers either purchase at an advertised price or search sequentially for other prices. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, sellers charge a high unadvertised price or advertise a price chosen from a lower interval. Increases in search or advertising costs raise equilibrium prices and affect equilibrium advertising intensity. Empirical results are consistent with most comparative static predictions. Sellers, however, price much lower and advertise more intensely than predicted. Consequently, market outcomes more closely resemble a perfect information, Bertrand‐like equilibrium than the imperfect information, mixed strategy equilibrium with significant seller market power.