A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
提出认知层级理论，解释博弈中玩家为何常偏离均衡，通过定义不同思考步数的策略层级拟合实验数据，平均1.5步能解释多种博弈行为。
Players in a game are “in equilibrium” if they are rational, and accurately predict other players' strategies. In many experiments, however, players are not in equilibrium. An alternative is “cognitive hierarchy” (CH) theory, where each player assumes that his strategy is the most sophisticated. The CH model has inductively defined strategic categories: step 0 players randomize; and step k thinkers best-respond, assuming that other players are distributed over step 0 through step k − 1. This model fits empirical data, and explains why equilibrium theory predicts behavior well in some games and poorly in others. An average of 1.5 steps fits data from many games. \n \n