Rate Making for Farm‐Level Crop Insurance: Implications for Adverse Selection
发现美国联邦作物保险中两个可能导致逆向选择的问题：费率与农户预期产量的关系，以及未使用趋势来设定预期产量导致的保障偏差。通过理论分析和农场数据验证，对个性化保险的费率制定有参考价值。
Abstract This research identifies two problems in the new Federal Crop Insurance that may cause adverse selection: ( a ) the relationship between rate making and expected yields for individual farmers, and ( b ) the bias introduced in coverage protection when trends are not used to establish expected yields. A theoretical investigation using the normality assumption demonstrates the potential severity of these problems, and empirical results from farm‐level data lend further support. As crop insurance changes to individualized methods of protection, these issues will be particularly important for developing rates.