Bargaining with Interdependent Values
分析了一个买家出价的无限期讨价还价博弈，其中卖家拥有关于商品价值的完美信息而买家没有。研究发现，当静态激励约束允许最优效率时，讨价还价结果随摩擦消失而趋近高效；否则，结果可能不如单期博弈，并出现协议概率的周期性爆发与长期延迟。
A seller and a buyer bargain over the terms of trade for an object. The seller receives a perfect signal that determines the value of the object to both players, whereas the buyer remains uninformed. We analyze the infinite-horizon bargaining game in which the buyer makes all the offers. When the static incentive constraints permit first-best efficiency, then under some regularity conditions the outcome of the sequential bargaining game becomes arbitrarily efficient as bargaining frictions vanish. When the static incentive constraints preclude first-best efficiency, the limiting bargaining outcome is not second-best efficient and may even perform worse than the outcome from the one-period bargaining game. With frequent buyer offers, the outcome is then characterized by recurring bursts of high probability of agreement, followed by long periods of delay in which the probability of agreement is negligible. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.