Vers and Expectations: Extensions and Evidence
分析预期未来自愿出口限制对当前出口水平的影响，发现传统结论取决于行业合谋程度和限制严格性，并通过欧盟进口监控数据检验，竞争性行业增加出口而垄断性行业减少。
This paper analyses the effects of an expected future voluntary export restraint on the level of firms' current exports to a market. The traditional result that current exports increase is shown to depend on the degree of collusion in the exporting industry and the anticipated restrictiveness of the VER. The former relationship is tested by reference to the effect of EC import surveillance on its imports. Surveillance is argued to indicate an increased probability of a VER in the future, and it is found that while competitive industries respond to it by increasing exports to the EC, less competitive ones curtail exports. This constitutes one of the few empirical tests of the strategic part of strategic trade policy.