Unconditional and Conditional Takeover Offers: Experimental Evidence
通过实验室实验比较了有限股东模型对有条件与无条件收购要约的预测与实际结果，发现无条件要约对大型群体（28-40人）的预测较准，其他情况结果不一。
This article compares the predictions of finite-shareholder models of conditional and unconditional takeover offers with the outcomes of laboratory experiments. In addition to differentiating between types of offers, the experimental designs span small and large firms as well as different levels of offer premiums. It is found that in unconditional offers to large groups of subjects (28–40), the symmetric Nash equilibrium predicts observed tendering frequencies quite accurately. For other experimental designs, the results are mixed. The analysis of shareholder tendering strategies from the experiment yields insights into (I) the effects of takeover offer designs, (ii) the appropriateness of finite-shareholder models for research, and (iii) the costs of free riding when shareholders are nonatomistic.