Moonlighting: public service and private practice
研究公立医院医生兼职私人执业时的激励问题，发现兼职可能提高或降低公立医疗质量，但总体提升消费者福利；未监管的兼职可能因医生行为变化而损害福利，价格监管可改善。
We study job incentives in moonlighting, when public‐service physicians may refer patients to their private practices. Some doctors in the public system are dedicated, and behave sincerely, but others—the moonlighters—are utility maximizers. Allowing moonlighting always enhances aggregate consumer welfare, but equilibrium public‐care quality may increase or decrease; if quality increases, moonlighting improves each consumer's expected utility. Unregulated moonlighting may reduce consumer welfare as a result of adverse behavioral reactions, such as moonlighters shirking more and dedicated doctors abandoning their sincere behavior. Price regulation in the private market limits such adverse behaviors in the public system and improves consumer welfare .