REFERENCE NORMS, STAGGERED WAGES, AND WAGE LEADERSHIP: THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE*
扩展了交错工资的泰勒模型，引入参考规范，发现其能显著增强通胀持续性，且效果取决于规范类型。基于奥地利1980-2006年集体谈判工资数据，证实工资设定受参考规范强烈影响，外部规范比内部规范更重要，并存在工资领导（不对称规范）的明确证据。
This article presents an extension of the Taylor model with staggered wages in which wage setting is also influenced by reference norms. We show that reference norms can considerably increase the persistence of inflation but that the size of this effect depends on the exact definition (e.g., external vs. internal, symmetric vs. asymmetric norms). Using data on collectively bargained wages in Austria from 1980 to 2006 we show that wage setting is strongly influenced by reference norms, that external norms seem to matter more than internal norms, and that there is a clear indication for the existence of wage leadership (asymmetric norms).