Constraints and incentives for making long horizon corporate investments
研究了企业何时进行长期投资，发现短期业绩差会抑制长期投资，尤其对新企业；高管可行使的股票期权多会减少长期投资，而未到期期权则促进长期投资。基于有线电视运营商1972-1996年数据验证。
Abstract This paper examines the conditions under which firms make long horizon investments (i.e., investments that take a long period of time to pay off). We predict firms are constrained from making long horizon investments when short‐term performance is poor—and this effect is especially pronounced for young firms. Moreover, we argue that when managers hold high levels of exercisable stock options, their firms are less likely to make long‐term investments. However, firms are more likely to pursue long horizon investments when managerial stock options are not yet exercisable. Based on analysis of investments made by cable television operators from 1972–1996, we find support for these predictions. In addition to enhancing our understanding of investment choices, these results—derived from the temporally focused analysis of an investment's payoff horizon—suggest that payoff horizon is an important investment attribute in its own right and should be analyzed distinctly from and in addition to other aspects of investments, such as expected return and risk. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.