LIQUIDITY AND INEFFICIENT INVESTMENT
在一个未来收入不可抵押的一般均衡模型中研究消费者流动性，发现流动性有助于克服双重需求不一致，但消费者过度囤积流动性导致竞争均衡低效，而负向冲击后的财政政策可提高事前福利。
We study consumer liquidity in a general equilibrium model where the friction is the nonpledgeability of future income. Liquidity helps to overcome the absence of a double coincidence of wants. Consumers over-hoard liquidity and the resulting competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient. Fiscal policy following a large negative shock can increase ex-ante welfare. If the government cannot commit, the ex-post optimal fiscal policy will be too small from an ex-ante perspective. The model throws light on the holding of foreign reserves in international markets.