Why are Most Funds Open-End? Competition and the Limits of Arbitrage
分析为何多数资产管理中介采用开放式结构，认为基金竞争吸引投资者资金时，开放式程度可能过度，导致即使无卖空限制，理性套利者也只能获得小额超额收益，而市场仍存在较大错误定价。
The majority of asset-management intermediaries (e.g., mutual funds, hedge funds) are structured on an open-end basis, even though it appears that the open-end form can be a serious impediment to arbitrage. I argue that when funds compete to attract investors' dollars, the equilibrium degree of open-ending in an economy can be excessive from the point of view of these investors. One implication of the analysis is that, even absent short-sales constraints or other frictions, economically large mispricings can coexist with rational, competitive arbitrageurs who earn small excess returns.