The Political Economy of Improving Health Care for the Poor in Rural Africa: Institutional Solutions to the Principal–Agent Problem
研究发现，收费的非政府组织（NGO）比政府运营的医疗设施更能满足非洲农村贫困人口的需求，因为它们解决了医疗信息不对称问题。基于喀麦隆数据的模拟表明，用管理分散的NGO取代政府设施能改善穷人福利，并分析了推行这一改革的政治可行性。
Both governments and private for-profit markets have been disappointing in meeting the needs of the African poor for health care. NGO services provide a much more attractive alternative for this clientele, despite the fees they charge. They do so because they represent an institutional solution to the ‘imperfect information’ problem in health care. Through simulations based on data from Cameroon, we demonstrate that if fee-charging NGOs replace the highly subsidised but poorly managed facilities operated by African governments the poor would be better off. Those NGOs that are decentralised in their financial and personnel management are most effective. The politics of making the recommended changes are assessed.