Noncooperative Foundations of the Area Monotonic Solution
研究有限备选方案下交替出价的博弈，刻画了子博弈完美均衡的唯一结果，并证明当备选方案均匀分布且数量趋于无穷时，该结果收敛于区域单调解。
Given a finite set of alternatives, players alternate making offers. Player 1 offers some alternative that 2 can accept or veto. If 2 accepts, it is enforced, and the game ends. Otherwise, 2 makes a counteroffer among the remaining alternatives, and so on. If all alternatives are vetoed, a disagreement alternative is enforced. First, we characterize the unique outcome of any subgame perfect equilibrium of this game. Then, we show that this outcome converges to the Area Monotonie Solution if the alternatives are uniformly distributed over the bargaining set, and as the number of alternatives tends to infinity.