Overcoming Inaction through Collective Institutional Entrepreneurship: Insights from Regime Theory
研究结合制度理论与制度理论，分析在复杂领域中如何通过集体制度创业克服个体利益导致的不合作，并以全球气候政策中《京都议定书》的形成为例说明。
Studies on institutional change generally pertain to the agency-structure paradox or the ability of institutional entrepreneurs to spearhead change despite constraints. In many complex fields, however, change also needs cooperation from numerous dispersed actors with divergent interests. This presents the additional paradox of ensuring that these actors engage in collective action when individual interests favor lack of cooperation. We draw on complementary insights from institutional and regime theories to identify drivers of collective institutional entrepreneurship and develop an analytical framework. This is applied to the field of global climate policy to illustrate how collective inaction was overcome to realize a global regulatory institution, the Kyoto Protocol.