Information Acquisition in Promotion Decisions
研究发现在晋升决策中，当组织需要公开拒绝理由时，选拔者会收集更多关于不合格候选人的信息；反之则信息收集较少。对管理者和HR有参考价值。
When organizations publicly post notices of promotional opportunities, they often must justify the rejection of unsuccessful applicants, and may therefore decide to rate all applicants. When the process is less public, however, selectors are not required to assign ratings to inferior candidates. We hypothesized that selectors would gather less information on inferior candidates when they were not required to rate them than when they were so required. Results of a study of 157 managers using an information display board methodology confirmed our hypothesis. Contrary to previous research in consumer behavior, individual proxies for “product familiarity,” such as number of years of previous work experience, were not related to information-gathering behavior.