Overconfidence, Compensation Contracts, and Capital Budgeting
研究发现风险厌恶的经理人适度过度自信能降低公司激励其追求高风险项目的成本，并促使公司提供更平坦的薪酬合约，但过度自信过高会导致经理人接受高凸性合约而承担过多风险。
ABSTRACT A risk‐averse manager's overconfidence makes him less conservative. As a result, it is cheaper for firms to motivate him to pursue valuable risky projects. When compensation endogenously adjusts to reflect outside opportunities, moderate levels of overconfidence lead firms to offer the manager flatter compensation contracts that make him better off. Overconfident managers are also more attractive to firms than their rational counterparts because overconfidence commits them to exert effort to learn about projects. Still, too much overconfidence is detrimental to the manager since it leads him to accept highly convex compensation contracts that expose him to excessive risk.