Fair Value Accounting and Managers' Hedging Decisions
通过两项实验发现，公允价值会计信息会促使经理人放弃经济上合理的对冲机会，尤其在标的资产价格波动大时更明显；突出经济信息或单独列示剔除公允价值重估的净利润可减轻这一负面效应。
ABSTRACT We conduct two experiments with experienced accountants to investigate how fair value accounting affects managers’ real economic decisions. In experiment 1, we find that participants are more likely to make suboptimal decisions (e.g., forgo economically sound hedging opportunities) when both the economic and fair value accounting impact information is presented than when only the economic impact information is presented, or when both the economic and historical cost accounting impact information is presented. This adverse effect of fair value accounting is more likely when the price volatility of the hedged asset is higher, which is a situation where, paradoxically, hedging is more beneficial. We find that the effect is mediated by participants’ relative considerations of economic factors versus accounting factors (e.g., earnings volatility). Experiment 2 shows that enhancing salience of economic information or separately presenting net income not from fair value remeasurements reduces the adverse effect of fair value accounting. Our findings are informative to standard setters in their debate on the efficacy of fair value accounting.