Federal Deposit Insurance, Regulatory Policy, and Optimal Bank Capital*
解释FDIC如何通过显性和隐性定价提供存款保险和监管，并论证关闭风险银行的时机是控制银行风险的关键。
ABSTRACT This paper seeks to explain the combination of explicit and implicit pricing for deposit insurance employed by the FDIC. Essentially, the FDIC sells two products—insurance and regulation. To span the product space, it must and does set two prices. We argue that the need to establish regulatory disincentives to bank risk‐taking is the heart of the controversy over the adequacy of bank capital and that the ability to close risky banks before exhausting their charter value (i.e., the value of their right to continue in business) stands at the center of these disincentives and in front of the FDIC's insurance reserves.