Reputation and Commitment in Two-Person Repeated Games Without Discounting
研究无贴现的两人重复博弈中，若玩家可能为自动机（承诺特定行动），则为正常类型玩家的纳什均衡收益提供下界，并扩展至双边不确定性情形。
Two-person repeated games with no discounting are considered where there is uncertainty about the type of the players. If there is a possibility that a player is an automaton committed to a particular pure or mixed stage -game action, then this provides a lower bound on the Nash equilibrium payoffs to a normal type of this player. The lower bound is the best available and is robust to the existence of other types. The results are extended to the case of two-sided uncertainty. This work extends Schmidt (1993) who analysed the restricted class of conflicting interest games.