Labor and Corporate Governance: International Evidence from Restructuring Decisions
研究发现，强大的工会法律既保护工人也保护表现不佳的管理者；在投资者保护弱的国家，工会与管理层结盟，通过出售资产避免大规模裁员，但导致业绩恶化；而在投资者保护强的国家，资产出售改善业绩并增加裁员。
ABSTRACT Our results highlight the importance of interaction among management, labor, and investors in shaping corporate governance. We find that strong union laws protect not only workers but also underperforming managers. Weak investor protection combined with strong union laws are conducive to worker–management alliances, wherein poorly performing firms sell assets to prevent large‐scale layoffs, garnering worker support to retain management. Asset sales in weak investor protection countries lead to further deteriorating performance, whereas in strong investor protection countries they improve performance and lead to more layoffs. Strong union laws are less effective in preventing layoffs when financial leverage is high.