How Pressure Groups Activate Voters and Move Candidates Closer to the Median
建模了候选人依赖压力集团资助政治广告和背书的情形，发现当无信息选民使用策略性经验法则时，压力集团的捐款反而使选举结果更接近中间选民，且无信息选民能获得与信息选民相同的影响力。
This article shows how uninformed but rational voters can respond intelligently to political advertising. The article models a situation where a candidate must rely on a pressure group for financing political advertising and making endorsements. The pressure group uses its power over the purse to influence the position chosen by the candidate. Nevertheless, when uninformed voters use a strategic rule of thumb, pressure-group contributions always move the outcome of the election closer to the median voter. By using such a rule of thumb, when there is advertising, uninformed voters can have the same influence on the election as informed voters. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009.