Fiscal Interactions and the Case for Carbon Taxes Over Grandfathered Carbon Permits
推导了碳税和可交易碳配额成本调整的简单公式，考虑与劳动力市场已有税收扭曲的互动，发现利用碳税或拍卖配额收入削减扭曲性税收可大幅抵消效率损失，从而在效率上支持碳税或拍卖配额优于祖父式配额。
This paper provides simple formulas for adjusting the costs of carbon taxes and tradable carbon permits to account for interactions with preexisting tax distortions in the labor market. Both policies reduce labor supply as they increase product prices and reduce real household wages; the resulting efficiency losses in the labor market can be substantial relative to partial equilibrium abatement costs. However, much of this added cost can be offset-and perhaps more than offset when additional distortions from the tax system are considered-if revenues from carbon taxes or auctioned permits are used to reduce distortionary taxes. Consequently, there can be a strong case on efficiency grounds for using carbon taxes or auctioned permits over grandfathered carbon permits.