Capital Budgeting, the Hold-up Problem, and Information System Design
研究信息系统设计如何影响经理在项目搜寻中的激励，通过权衡套牢问题中管理松弛的成本（如额外津贴）与收益（激励更努力搜寻），发现最优信息系统有时包含粗略、滞后及混合监控与自报信息。
In this article, we explore the connection between information system design and incentives for project search. The choice of an information system affects the level of managerial slack that is generated during project implementation. Whether slack is beneficial or costly to an organization has been the subject of debate. In our model of the hold-up problem in capital budgeting, there are both costs and benefits to having managerial slack. The cost of slack is the consumption of perquisites by the manager. The benefit of slack is that it can serve as a motivational tool. The possibility of increasing his slack may encourage a self-interested manager to conduct a more diligent search for a profitable project. To trade off the costs and benefits of slack in our model, an optimal information system sometimes incorporates coarse information, late information, and a mix of monitored and self-reported information. These features are familiar to accountants. Accounting incorporates both verified (monitored) and unverified (self-reported) information and provides information that is aggregated (coarse) and historical (late).