Social Security and the Retirement Decision
通过放松完美资本市场、精算公平和确定寿命三个假设，分析社会保障和私人养老金对个人退休决策的影响，发现强制储蓄和精算不公平可能促使提前退休，而保险效应则因替代效应而方向不明。
The effect of Social Security and private pensions on individual retirement decisions is modeled, relaxing in turn three commonly maintained assumptions—perfect capital markets, actuarial fairness, and certain lifetimes—which together imply that there is no effect. In each case, raising the contribution level can cause systematic changes (of either sign in general) in individual retirement decisions. For Social Security, the effects associated with forced saving and deviations from actuarial fairness probably tend to advance retirement. But those effects that arise solely from the insurance aspect of Social Security and private pensions are ambiguous in sign, owing to the presence of a substitution effect that tends to delay retirement because the insurance benefits can be fully realized only by working longer.