Incentive‐Based Budgeting Systems in Public Universities
本书评述了公立大学激励导向预算制度的理论、案例与分析，指出该制度将院系设为自主成本中心，但经济学家质疑其效率，适合对高校预算改革感兴趣的读者。
Incentive‐based budgeting in higher education comes in many guises; and this edited collection, Incentive‐based Budgeting Systems in Public Universities (Edward Elgar Press, 2002), does a good job in reviewing the theory, describing case studies, and offering analysis of this multifaceted practice. The book is well‐written, sufficiently rigorous, and insightful of how such budgeting systems work in higher education; it describes a sensible alternative to the more common practices of formula funding, activity‐based costing, and incremental budgeting. After a short Introduction by the Editors, the book divides into three Sections with contributions from Economists, administrators, and those who are both. Each Section has interesting Chapters. The ‘Overview’ addresses the need for Incentive‐Based Budgeting (IBB). IBB is a somewhat vague term (all systems have incentives to do ‘something’), but it rests largely on turning university departments, colleges, and faculties into autonomous ‘cost centres’ and ‘decision‐making units’ with only a light‐touch central administration. To Economists, who favour atomistic competition, are wary of inefficiencies in command structures, think information costs rise sharply, and are sceptical of the existence of public goods, the wonder is why IBB is not the status quo. John Wilson’s excellent Chapter (‘The efficiency of responsibility centre management’, Chapter 2) robustly reviews this presumption, and rejects it. Because these autonomous centres/units do not control tuition prices but instead receive formula funding from the central administration, they are unlikely to make efficient resource allocation decisions. Because centres/units are not profit‐maximising, the logic of the competitive market cannot be applied. Because students are not homogeneous inputs (or outputs), centres/units will have difficulty in responding to students’ needs. And because there are many university‐wide externalities from a student in a given department, centres/units will not ‘price’ student behaviour optimally. Wilson’s arguments are strong, expressed fully, and would serve as engaging reading for students wishing to apply the theory of the market to real, complex organisations. (It is less formal – and more general – than Winston’s (1999) intelligent treatment of financing in US universities). But, it is unclear how alternative budgeting systems would improve on IBB, so as to resolve the difficulties that Wilson catalogues. Moreover, introducing IBB into public universities is clearly practicable, as several case studies attest.