Land Tenure and Allocative Efficiency in Niger
利用地块数据，研究尼日尔传统土地保有权制度是否阻碍了农业配置效率，发现劳动力对产量影响大，且农民更倾向于在自有地上施肥而非借入地。
Abstract Using field‐level data, we investigate whether traditional land tenure systems are an impediment to allocative efficiency in Niger. We find that yields are strongly influenced by the manpower available to farming households, an indication that marginal returns to labor and land are not equalized across households. We uncover no relationship between manuring and whether or not local customs allow land sales. But manuring is influenced by tenure security: farmers who cultivate both borrowed and owned fields divert manure toward the latter. Our findings do not imply that a change in land tenure system is called for.