Throwing caution to the wind: The effect of CEO stock option pay on the incidence of product safety problems
研究发现CEO股票期权薪酬会降低其谨慎性，导致产品安全问题增多，且该效应受CEO任期和创始人身份影响。
Stock options are thought to align the interests of CEOs and shareholders, but scholars have shown that options sometimes lead to outcomes that run counter to what they are meant to achieve. Building on this research, we argue that options promote a lack of caution in CEOs that manifests in a higher incidence of product safety problems. We also posit that this relationship varies across CEOs , and that the effect of options will depend upon CEO characteristics such as tenure and founder status. Analyzing product recall data for a large sample of FDA ‐regulated companies, we find support for our theory . Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.