On the consistency of data with bargaining theories
研究了有限讨价还价结果数据与纳什、功利主义、平等主义最大最小等经典理论的观测一致性，提出了检验程序，可用于评估税收法规是否符合平等损失原则。
Abstract. We develop observable restrictions of well-known theories of bargaining over money. We assume given a finite data set of bargaining outcomes, including data on allocations and outside options, but no information on utility functions. We ask when a given theory could have generated the data. If the outside options are fixed and symmetric, we show that Nash, utilitarian, and the egalitarian max-min bargaining solutions are all observationally equivalent. These theories are in turn characterized by a simple test of comonotonicity of bargaining outcomes. If the outside options are arbitrary, we establish different testing procedures for each of the theories under consideration. The main application of our result is to testing the tax code for compliance with the principle of equal loss. 1.