Voter Preferences, Polarization, and Electoral Policies
在Hotelling-Downs选举模型变体中分析凸效用函数的影响，发现当选民效用函数足够凸时，均衡政策会分化；涉及多个议题时，政策在“凸议题”上分化，在“凹议题”上趋同。
In most variants of the Hotelling-Downs model of election, it is assumed that voters have concave utility functions. This assumption is arguably justified in issues such as economic policies, but convex utilities are perhaps more appropriate in others, such as moral or religious issues. In this paper, we analyze the implications of convex utility functions in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model with a polarized voter distribution. We show that the equilibrium policies diverge if and only if voters' utility function is sufficiently convex. If two or more issues are involved, policies converge in “concave issues” and diverge in “convex issues.”