Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Causal Evidence from the Courts*
利用美国联邦巡回上诉法院法官的随机分配，研究发现专利无效化使后续引用增加50%，在计算机、电子和医疗器械领域阻碍下游创新，且主要由大公司专利无效后小公司跟进创新驱动。
Abstract Cumulative innovation is central to economic growth. Do patent rights facilitate or impede follow-on innovation? We study the causal effect of removing patent rights by court invalidation on subsequent research related to the focal patent, as measured by later citations. We exploit random allocation of judges at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to control for endogeneity of patent invalidation. Patent invalidation leads to a 50% increase in citations to the focal patent, on average, but the impact is heterogeneous and depends on characteristics of the bargaining environment. Patent rights block downstream innovation in computers, electronics, and medical instruments, but not in drugs, chemicals, or mechanical technologies. Moreover, the effect is entirely driven by invalidation of patents owned by large patentees that triggers more follow-on innovation by small firms.