A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms
提出了一个垄断网络定价的一般理论，平台通过绝缘性定价避免协调失败，利润最大化仅内化边际用户的网络外部性，并基于用户收入或规模差异构建了更合理的异质性模型，有助于衡量市场势力及预测价格管制与并购的影响。
I develop a general theory of monopoly pricing of networks. Platforms use insulating tariffs to avoid coordination failure, implementing any desired allocation. Profit maximization distorts in the spirit of A. Michael Spence (1975) by internalizing only network externalities to marginal users. Thus the empirical and prescriptive content of the popular Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole (2006) model of two-sided markets turns on the nature of user heterogeneity. I propose a more plausible, yet equally tractable, model of heterogeneity in which users differ in their income or scale. My approach provides a general measure of market power and helps predict the effects of price regulation and mergers.