Residual Income-Based Compensation Plans for Controlling Investment Decisions Under Sequential Private Information
证明，在序贯逆向选择模型（含放弃期权）中，基于特定权责发生制规则（如相对收益分配规则）的剩余收入指标仍能有效激励经理人，即使存在私有信息和期权执行要求。
Earlier literature has pointed to the effectiveness of residual income-type measures based on particular accrual accounting rules such as the relative benefit allocation rule. These performance metrics have been shown to generate desirable managerial incentives when investment decisions are delegated. This paper further attests to the robustness of these measures by extending the result to a sequential adverse selection model with an inherent real option (an option to abandon). In other words, as long as the residual income measures are judiciously constructed, neither private information nor the requirement to selectively exercise an option derails their use in this setting.