A Reexamination of the Motives and Gains in Joint Ventures
区分横向与纵向合资企业，发现横向合资创造协同收益由双方共享，而纵向合资仅使供应商获益，类似简单合同；企业选择纵向合资而非合同是为了应对敲竹杠问题和供应商融资约束，不支持风险分担动机。
We distinguish between horizontal and vertical joint ventures, and find correspondingly different valuation effects. Horizontal joint ventures create synergistic gains that are shared by the partners. In contrast, vertical joint ventures generate gains only for suppliers. This is similar to the patter we find for simple contracts, which suggests economic similiarities between vertical joint ventures and contracts. Analysing firms' choices between these contracting options, we find that firms choose vertical joint ventures over simple contracts when potential hold-up problems are severe and when suppliers face finance constraints. The results d not support a risk-sharing motive for joint ventures.