The risk premium for evaluating public projects
论证政府借贷成本低并非源于项目选择能力，而是纳税人承担了隐性信用保险，因此公共项目评估应使用与私人投资相同的风险调整资本成本，为私有化提供理论依据。
Governments face a lower apparent cost of capital than private firms. However, the low cost of borrowing by governments does not reflect superior capabilities to choose or manage projects. Instead, it reflects the fact that governments have recourse to taxpayers, who de facto provide a fairly open-ended credit insurance to the government. If taxpayers were remunerated for the risk they assume in the case of tax-financed projects, then ex ante there would be no capital cost advantage to government finance. The risk premium on government finance would, in principle, be no different from that of private investors. There is thus no justification on the basis of capital cost advantages for government funding or guaranteeing the provision of private goods or services. Privatization is, therefore, valuable, if it improves business efficiency when evaluated at the risk-adjusted private cost of capital. No more need be demonstrated in a value-for-money test. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.