Forward Contracts and Firm Value: Investment Incentive and Contracting Effects
论证企业通过远期合约对冲风险能减少投资不足的激励，从而提升企业价值；同时改善与客户、债权人及管理者的合约条款，且这些好处无法通过个人对冲复制。
Corporate risk hedging with forward contracts increases value by reducing incentives to underinvest. This occurs because the hedge decreases the sensitivity of senior claim value to incremental investment, allowing equity holders to capture a larger portion of the incremental benefit from new investment. Hedging also allows the firm to credibly commit to meet obligations in states where it otherwise could not, which improves contract terms the firm can negotiate with customers, creditors, and managers. These benefits cannot be duplicated by individual hedging, and each result holds independent of agents' risk preferences.