Explicit versus Implicit Contracts: Evidence from CEO Employment Agreements
研究企业与CEO之间是使用显性（书面）合同还是隐性协议。发现标普500公司中不到一半的CEO有全面的显性雇佣协议，且显性合同在关系不确定性高、CEO潜在损失大时更常见、期限更长。
ABSTRACT We report evidence on the determinants of whether the relationship between a firm and its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is governed by an explicit (written) or an implicit agreement. We find that fewer than half of the CEOs of S&P 500 firms have comprehensive explicit employment agreements. Consistent with contracting theory, explicit agreements are more likely to be observed and are likely to have a longer duration in situations in which the sustainability of the relationship is less certain and where the expected loss to the CEO is greater if the firm fails to honor the agreement.