An Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact
用一个简化模型分析欧洲货币联盟国家的稳定与增长公约，发现短视政府会通过签约约束债务政策对通胀的外部性，并探讨不确定性下货币联盟加适当公约优于自主，以及初始条件差异导致的利益冲突。
We use a stylised model to analyse the Stability and Growth Pact for countries that have formed the European Monetary Union (EMU). In our model, shortsighted governments fail to internalise the consequences of their debt policies for the common inflation rate fully. Therefore, while governments have no incentive to sign a stability pact in the absence of a monetary union, they do so with monetary union to restrain this externality. With uncertainty, a monetary union combined with an appropriately designed pact will be strictly preferred to autonomy. With differences in initial conditions, conflicts of interest arise. We study the Nash bargaining solution.