Polarization and Inefficient Policies
两党目标不同，选民不确定公共品生产成本。选举后胜方政策实施，选民和政党关心公共品水平与成本。揭示均衡中选民了解成本并调整政策，非揭示均衡则否。偏好极化时仅非揭示均衡满足直觉准则，相似时仅揭示均衡满足，因此政治极化降低信息揭示。
Two parties have different goals. Voters, but not parties, are uncertain about the functioning of the economy, in this case the costs of producing a public good. The parties each propose a policy, an election is held and the policy of the winning party is implemented. Voters and parties care about the level of the public good and costs. Two kinds of sequential equilibria exist; revealing, where voters learn the true costs and the implemented policy adjusts to costs, and non-revealing. If parties' preferences are polarized only non-revealing equilibria fulfill a refinement criterion like the intuitive criterion. If they are alike only revealing equilibria fulfill this criterion. Thus less political polarization improves information revelation.