The Optimality of a Monetary Union without a Fiscal Union
研究货币联盟与财政联盟的利弊，发现货币联盟虽无法用货币政策应对国别冲击，但能缓解通胀偏差对财政纪律的削弱，因此可能优于财政联盟。
The paper explores the case for monetary and fiscal unification. Monetary policy suffers from an inflation bias because the monetary authorities are not able to commit. With international risk-sharing, fiscal discipline suffers from moral hazard. An inflation target alleviates the inflation bias but weakens fiscal discipline. In a monetary union, however, this adverse effect on fiscal discipline is weaker. This advantage of monetary unification may outweigh the disadvantage of not being able to employ monetary policy to stabilise country-specific shocks. While monetary unification may thus be optimal, international risk-sharing may be undesirable because it weakens fiscal discipline