Leakage, Welfare, and Cost-Effectiveness of Carbon Policy
扩展了Fullerton等人的模型，研究单边气候政策在存在泄漏时的成本效益，发现负泄漏情况下碳税会导致福利损失，而正泄漏时单边政策可能改善福利。
We extend the model of Fullerton, Karney, and Baylis (2012) to explore cost-effectiveness of unilateral climate policy in the presence of leakage. We ignore the welfare gain from reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and focus on the welfare cost of the emissions tax or permit scheme. Whereas that prior paper solves for changes in emissions quantities and finds that leakage may be negative, we show here that all cases with negative leakage in that model are cases where a unilateral carbon tax results in a welfare loss. With positive leakage, however, a unilateral policy can improve welfare.