Dynamic Kidney Exchange
研究在动态变化的参与者池中，如何通过集中机制高效进行基于时间和兼容性偏好的易货交换，推导出最优的双向和多向交换机制，并应用于肾脏交换，提出政策建议。
We study how barter exchanges should be conducted through a centralized mechanism in a dynamically evolving agent pool with time- and compatibility-based preferences. We derive the dynamically efficient <it>two-way</it> and <it>multi-way</it> exchange mechanisms that maximize total discounted exchange surplus. Recently several live-donor kidney exchange programmes were established to swap incompatible donors of end-stage kidney disease patients. Since kidney exchange can be modelled as a special instance of our more general model, dynamically efficient kidney exchange mechanisms are derived as corollaries. We make policy recommendations using simulations.