Community, collective action and common grazing: The case of post‐socialist Mongolia
运用集体行动与交易成本理论，结合蒙古国牧区的实证研究，探讨牧民生计中公共放牧的管理问题，发现跨活动合作能降低公共资源治理的交易成本，而集体化与去集体化对合作激励有不同影响。
This article applies collective‐action and transaction‐cost theory to the theoretical debate around the management of common property regimes (CPRs), with supporting evidence from recent empirical research in Mongolian pastoralism. Rather than treating CPR management as an activity in isolation, as much of the existing literature tends to do, this study examines the use of common grazing in the context of other aspects of pastoral livelihoods. The more a given group of herders find reason to co‐operate with each other across a range of activities, it is argued, the more likely it is that they will also overcome the transaction costs involved in controlling the use of the commons. The empirical analysis finds that incentives for cooperation were weakened under agricultural collectivisation (1950s‐1980s), with possible adverse consequences for the commons. Decollectivisation from the early 1990s has seen the re‐emergence of autonomous co‐operation among herders, accompanied by changes in intra‐community dynamics, which together suggest contradictory trends for the future management of common grazing.