Family Control and Ownership Monitoring in Family‐Controlled Firms in Japan
研究了日本场外交易市场中家族控制上市公司中，家族控制与股利支付和盈利能力的关系，发现家族控制正向影响股利支付，而外资持股会削弱这一关系并提升盈利能力。
abstract This paper focuses on a type of firms that have been traditionally neglected in both family business and governance research, namely, family‐controlled, publicly‐listed firms. Although principal–agent conflicts may be less prevalent in such firms, family control can potentially give rise to principal–principal conflicts, leading to expropriation of the wealth of minority owners by family owners. Superior firm performance and the willingness to distribute the profits through dividend payments would suggest the absence of such expropriation. Based on a sample of 210 OTC firms in Japan, we examined the relationships between family control and dividend payouts and profitability. Our results indicate that family control was positively related to dividend payouts. Further, we found that while foreign ownership interacted with family control to reduce dividend payouts and increase profitability, bank ownership did not have such an effect.