Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection
研究了在卖方拥有产品质量私人信息且买方提供非排他性合同时的市场均衡，给出了纯策略均衡存在的充要条件，并发现交易合约利润为零且交易效率高。
A seller of a divisible good faces several identical buyers. The quality of the good may be low or high, and is the seller's private information. The seller has strictly convex preferences that satisfy a single-crossing property. Buyers compete by posting menus of nonexclusive contracts, so that the seller can simultaneously and privately trade with several buyers. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium. Aggregate equilibrium trades are unique. Any traded contract must yield zero profit. If a quality is actually traded, then it is efficiently traded. Depending on parameters, both qualities may be traded, or only one of them, or the market may break down to a no-trade equilibrium.